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DEPRIZIO'S HONOR: LENDERS, INSIDER
GUARANTORS AND THE PRISONERS'
DILEMMA
Walter A. Effross*
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the primary goals of bankruptcy law is "the equitable
distribution of a troubled company's assets through the equal
sharing of losses of creditors of equal rank."' To this end, the
Bankruptcy Code (the Code)2 prevents debtors approaching
bankruptcy from exercising favoritism towards any creditor. An
insolvent debtor cannot circumvent the Code by preferentially
transferring an interest in property to, or for the benefit of, one
creditor over others so as to grant that creditor more than it
would have otherwise received in the debtor's liquidation or re-
organization under the Code. If such a transfer, or "preference,"
has been made within 90 days of the debtor's filing for bank-
ruptcy, it is recoverable by the bankruptcy trustee for more equi-
table distribution to creditors.3
Given the ability of insiders of the debtor to predict and con-
trol the timing of the debtor's bankruptcy, an even more strin-
gent "preference period" applies to transfers benefiting insiders.
A preferential transfer made to or for the benefit of an insider of
the debtor must be returned if made within one year preceding the
debtor's bankruptcy filing.4
The one-year preference period applies to an insider who
causes the debtor to repay loans to the insider before the debtor
repays loans to other creditors. In that situation, the insider di-
rectly receives the benefit of the transfers. Under the terms of
the Code, the one-year period should also apply where an insider
guarantees a loan made to the debtor by a lender or other non-
* Mr. Effross is associated with the firm McCarter & English, Newark, New
Jersey. Sections I and II of this paper benefited from the author's discussions with
Richard W. Hill and Hayden Smith, Jr. of McCarter & English.
1 M. BIENENSTOCK, BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION 1 (1988). The other goal is
identified as "the restructuring of a business to preserve jobs, to pay creditors, to
produce a return for owners," and to benefit the nation's economy. Id. These poli-
cies are clearly interdependent.
2 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988).
3 See id. § 547(b)(4)(A).
4 See id. § 547(b)(4)(B).
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insider creditor 5 and then causes the debtor to repay that loan
preferentially.6 Since the insider guarantor is a contingent credi-
tor of the debtor (i.e., may be liable for paying the debtor's obli-
gations to the lender and would then be able to assert claims
against the debtor for reimbursement), the debtor's loan repay-
ments are essentially transfers made for the benefit of the insider.
Here, recovery can be made either from the lender, as initial
transferee, or from the insider guarantor who receives the benefit
of the transfer.
Until recently, however, courts found it inequitable to invoke
the one-year preference period to recover from lenders transfers
made by the debtor for the benefit of its insider guarantors.7 The
first court of appeals decision to reverse this trend was Levit v.
Ingersoll Rand Financial Corp. (In re VN. Deprizio Construction Co. ).'
Because the circuits are split on the application of this "ex-
tended" preference period, Deprizio has generated nationwide
concern within the lending community. A personal guarantee of
a corporate insider, once taken as a matter of course, may now
result in a lender's being forced to disgorge payments made
within one year, as opposed to within ninety days, of the debtor's
filing for bankruptcy.
Behind the "equity" arguments advanced against Deprizio,
and the literal statutory arguments in its favor, lie economic reali-
ties illuminated by game theory's well-known problem of the
Prisoner's Dilemma. By mathematically modeling the relative
expectations of the insider guarantors and of the lenders, the
consequences of Deprizio can be more clearly identified and
examined.
II. THE CASE LAW
A. Pre-Deprizio- "Equity" Considerations
Section 550(a)9 provides that, to the extent that transfers
made by the debtor are avoidable under Section 547, they are
5 Subsequent references to "lenders" shall assume that such creditors are not
insiders of the debtor.
6 See id. § 547(b)(1).
7 See infra notes 9-27 and accompanying text.
8 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989).
9 Code section 550(a) provides that:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent
that a transfer is avoided under section . . . 547 . . . of this title, the
trustee may recover, for the benefit of the estate, the property trans-
ferred, or, if the court so orders, the value of such property, from -
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recoverable either from the lender, as the initial transferee, or
from the guarantor, as "the entity for whose benefit such transfer
was made."' ° Thus, under section 547(b)(4)(A)," the debtor's
trustee in bankruptcy could recover from either the lender or the
guarantor the preferential repayments made by the debtor within
ninety days of its filing for bankruptcy.
Until 1983, however, courts were reluctant to impose the
one-year preference period of section 547(b)(4)(B) to recover,
from non-insider lenders, repayments secured by the guarantees
(1) the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose
benefit such transfer was made; or
(2) any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial
transferee.
11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (1988).
10 Section 101 (30)(B) of the Code defines an "insider" of a corporate debtor as:
(i) director of the debtor;
(ii) officer of the debtor;
(iii) person in control of the debtor;
(iv) partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(v) general partner of the debtor; or
(vi) relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person in con-
trol of the debtor.
11 U.S.C. § 101(30)(B) (1988). Under Section 101(30)(E), insiders of a corporate
debtor also include its affiliates, and insiders of its affiliates. An affiliate includes,
generally, an entity owning or controlling twenty percent or more of the voting
securities of the debtor, a corporation twenty percent or more of whose voting se-
curities are owned by the debtor, an entity whose business or substantially all of
whose property is operated under a lease or operating agreement by the debtor,
and an entity that operates the business or substantially all of the property of the
debtor under a lease or operating agreement. 11 U.S.C. 10 1(2) (1988).
t Section 547(b) provides that:
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the trustee
may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property-
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor
before such transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made -
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the
petition; or
(B) between ninety days and one year before the date of the
filing of the petition, if such creditor at the time of such trans-
fer was an insider; and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive
if-
(A) the case were a case under Chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent pro-
vided by the provisions of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988).
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of the debtor's insiders. 2 Although both the lender and the
guarantor would qualify as "creditors" of the debtor,' 3 it was
seen as unfair to recover the loan payments from a lender that in
good faith had sought the guarantee of an insider.' 4 Was it not
the insider that had manipulated the debtor into making prefer-
ential payments to an innocent lender? In the oft-quoted words
of a leading treatise:
In some circumstances, a literal application of section 550(a)
would permit the trustee to recover from a party who is inno-
cent of wrongdoing and deserves protection. In such circum-
stances the bankruptcy court should use its equitable powers
[under section 105(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1481] to prevent an in-
equitable result. For example ... if a transfer is made to a
creditor who is not an insider more than 90 days but within
one year before bankruptcy and the effect is to prefer[entially
benefit] an insider-guarantor, recovery should be restricted to
the guarantor and the creditor should be protected. Other-
wise, a creditor who does not demand a guarantor can be bet-
ter off than one who does.' 5
Thus, to defeat recovery from the lender as an "initial trans-
feree" of preferential repayments made between ninety days and
12 Id.
13 The insider guarantor holds a contingent right to payment from the debtor,
because the guarantor may proceed against the debtor for any amounts that the
guarantor pays to the lender under his guarantee. The insider thus has a "claim"
under section 101 (4)(A), which defines claim as a "right to payment, whether or not
such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, ma-
tured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured."
11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A) (1988) (emphasis added). As holder of a claim, the insider
guarantor is a creditor under Section 101(9), which defines a "creditor" as an:
(A) entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the
time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor;
(B) entity that has a claim against the estate of a kind specified in
section 348(d), 502(f), 5 0 2 (g), 502(h) or 502(i) of this title; or
(C) entity that has a community claim.
11 U.S.C. § 101(a) (1988).
14 See, e.g., Bakst v. Schilling (In re Cove Patio Corp.), 19 Bankr. 843, 844 (S.D.
Fla. 1982).
15 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 550.02, at 550-58 (15th ed. 1990). Section
105(a) authorizes the bankruptcy court to "issue any order, process, or judgment
that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title [as well as],
sua sponte, taking any action or making any determination necessary or appropri-
ate to enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of pro-
cess." 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988). 28 U.S.C. § 1481 (1988) provides that "[a]
bankruptcy court shall have the powers of a court of equity, law, and admiralty, but
may not enjoin another court or punish a criminal contempt not committed in the
presence of the judge of the court or warranting a punishment of imprisonment."
28 U.S.C. § 1481 (1982), ineffective by Pub. L. No. 98-454, § 1001, 98 Stat. 1745
(1984).
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one year preceding the debtor's bankruptcy, one court found that
the dual recovery provision of section 550(a)(1) "[i]mplied ... a
necessity for the exercise of discretion by the court," because the
equities did not favor recovery from non-insider lenders.' 6 Another
court noted in dictum that "even if a preferential transfer did
occur, no recovery should be had against the defendant" lender.' 7
A third court declined to apply the extended preference period to a
good faith transferee, even though the trustee alleged that the trans-
fer was made by the debtor for the benefit of insiders: the "obvious
purpose" of section 550(a)(1) would not permit the recovery of a
preference that "admittedly would not be recoverable under
§ 547," since the good faith transferee was not an insider.' 8 Finally,
a fourth court would not permit the lender to be "penalized for its
prudence in seeking a guarantor of the debt .... ."t9
While these decisions invoked the somewhat nebulous grounds
of equity, it fell to the bankruptcy court in Goldberger v. Davis Jay Cor-
rugated Box Corp. (In re Mercon Industries, Inc.),2° to advance a more
elaborate "two-transfer" theory concerning payments on guaran-
teed loans.2 ' The single transfer of funds from debtor to lender,
according to the court, actually "effected two transfers under sec-
tion 550(a)(1) of the Code":22 one transfer to the "initial trans-
feree" and the other to "the entity for whose benefit such transfer
was made."2 The first of these transfers, from the debtor to the
lender, reduced the balance of the indebtedness. The second and
simultaneous transfer, from the debtor to the guarantor, reduced
16 Backhus v. Central Trust Co. (In re Duccilli Formal Wear, Inc.), 8 Bankr. Ct.
Dec. (CRR) 1180, 1183 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982).
17 Seeley v. Church Buildings and Interiors, Inc. (In re Church Buildings and
Interiors, Inc.), 14 Bankr. 128, 131 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1981).
18 Bakst v. Schilling (In re Cove Patio Corp.), 19 Bankr. 843, 844 (S.D. Fla.
1982).
19 Schmitt v. Equibank (In re R.A. Beck Builder, Inc.), 34 Bankr. 888, 894
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1983); Ray v. City Bank & Trust Co. (In re C-L Cartage Co.), 70
Bankr. 928, 933-34 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1987), aff'd, 113 Bankr. 416 (E.D. Tenn.
1988), rev'd, 899 F.2d 1490 (6th Cir. 1990) (agreeing with "majority" of courts that
"insider preferences outside the 90 days can be recovered only from the insider");
In re Aerco Metals, Inc., 60 Bankr. 77, 82 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985) (declining "to
punish the Bank for the prudence it exercised in obtaining a guaranty" from an
insider).
20 37 Bankr. 549 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984).
21 Id. at 552.
22 Id. (footnote omitted). Section 101 (50) defines a "transfer" to include "every
mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of dis-
posing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including reten-
tion of title as a security interest .. ." 11 U.S.C. § 10 1(50) (1988).
23 Mercon, 37 Bankr. at 552 n.6 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1)).
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the guarantor's exposure on its guarantee, thereby reducing the
guarantor's contingent liability to the lender.24
Under Mercon, the extended preference period of section
547(b) would not apply to the first transfer, because neither the
lender nor the debtor was an "insider." Only the second transfer
would involve an insider (the guarantor, as a "mediate trans-
feree"25 ) to invoke the extended preference period: thus, "a finding
of liability on one transfer is independent of the other, rather than
derivative."26
The two-transfer approach was further endorsed by the bank-
ruptcy court in Deprizio.2 7 The Deprizio court declined to apply the
extended preference period to recover from a construction com-
pany's commercial creditors the repayments made by the company
on debts guaranteed by the company's insiders. The bankruptcy
court's decision, however, would soon be reversed.
B. The Literal Approach: Deprizio, its Ancestors and its Progeny
In 1983, the established equitable resistance towards apply-
ing the extended preference period to non-insider lenders began
to crumble. In Mixon v. Mid-Continent Systems, Inc. (In re Big Three
Association),28 the court "refuse[d] to overlook the unambiguous
language" of section 550(a)(1), which specifically allows recovery
from the lender as "initial transferee" as well as from the guaran-
tor as the "entity for whose benefit such transfer was made." 29
To replace the favored quotation of the courts that had previ-
24 Id. at 552. Strictly speaking, the "two-transfer" theory refers to two types of
transfers, not to the number of those transfers that can be identified in each situa-
tion. For example, where there are three insider guarantors, there will be four
identifiable transfers corresponding to each payment made by the debtor - one to
the lender and one to each of the guarantors.
25 The Mercon analysis predicated the liability of the guarantors on section
550(a)(2), as "immediate or mediate transferees of [the lender, the] initial trans-
feree," rather than under section 550(a)(1), as "the entity for whose benefit [the
initial] transfer was made." Id. at 552-53.
26 Id. at 552. Another way to phrase this test is that "the reference to 'initial
transferee' in § 550(a) of the Code must be construed to mean an initial transferee
with respect to whom the transfer was preferential." Block v. Texas Commerce Bank Nat'l
Ass'n (In re Midwestern Companies, Inc.), 96 Bankr. 224, 227 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1988), aff'd, 102 Bankr. 169 (W.D. Mo. 1989). Under the two-transfer analysis, the
lender as initial transferee is not an insider, and thus does not qualify for the ex-
tended preference period.
27 58 Bankr. 478 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986), rev'd, 86 Bankr. 545 (D. 111. 1988), aff'd,
874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989).
28 41 Bankr. 16, 20 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1983).
29 Id. at 20-21.
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ously addressed this issue, Big Three extracted its own shibboleth
from the relevant legal scholarship: ,
As hard as one searches, one is unable to uncover any material
evidence in the Code or its legislative history that Congress
intended paragraph 550(a)(1) to operate less than literally
merely because one of the potential defendants designated in
that paragraph supplies the factual predicate for avoiding a
transfer. In fact, in the original bills approved by the Senate
and the House of Representatives, each version of Section 550
mandated recovery from the "initial transferee" alone.
30
This literal view was adopted by the district court in Deprizio.3 t
The references in section 550 of the Code to both the "initial trans-
feree" and "the entity for whose benefit the transfer was made"
were perceived as the statutory acknowledgment that one transfer
could benefit both the lender and the guarantor. Such an analysis
precluded consideration of the two-transfer theory.32
The two-transfer theory was further discredited by the Deprizio
bankruptcy court's observation that the Code's definition of "trans-
fer," with its emphasis on the "disposing of or parting with prop-
erty," was clearly based on the perspective of the single transferor,
and not on that of the one or more transferees. s Finally, as the
30 Id. at 21 (quoting Pitts, Insider Guaranties and the Law of Preferences, 55 AM.
BANKR. L. J. 343, 347 (1981)) (citing S. 2266, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. § 101 (1978)
(proposed 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1); H.R. 8200, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. § 101 (1977)
(proposed 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1)).
The Big Three court noted that: "In the precursor to Section 550 proposed by
the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, the primary target of
the trustee's recovery was likewise the initial transferee. REPORT OF THE COMMIS-
SION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, 93rd
Cong. 1st Sess., pt. II, at 178 (1973). In explaining this section, the Commission
stated that it "covers all initial transferees of recoverable property, not just those pre-
ferred. Big Three Assoc., 41 Bankr. at 21 n. 1. (emphasis supplied)."
3' 86 Bankr. 545, 550 (N.D. Ill. 1988), aff'd, 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989).
32 In Deprizio, the district court held that "Where Congress has crafted an unam-
biguous comprehensive statutory scheme, such as it has in the Code, we are ex-
tremely hesitate to tamper with that scheme by use of vague equitable powers."
Deprizio, 86 Bankr. at 552. See also Ray v. City Bank and Trust Co. (In re C-L Cartage
Co.), 899 F.2d 1490, 1495 (6th Cir. 1990) (straightforward application of statutory
language consistent with policies that Code sections were enacted to further); In re
Installation Services, Inc., 101 Bankr. 282, 284 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1989) (favoring
literal reading of section 550(a)(1) "to express Congressional policy favoring equal-
ity in distribution, a desirable goal in the management of debtors' estates"). Cf
Reigel v. Mahajan (In re Kumar Bavishi & Assoc.), 906 F.2d 942 (3d Cir. 1990)(de-
clining to apply method analogous to two transfer analysis to debtor-guarantor
transactions). Reigel is analyzed in greater depth in Effross, Doorway to Deprizio, N.J.
STATE BAR Assoc. CREDITOR AND DEBTOR RELATIONS SECTION NEWSLETrER, Vol.
XII, No.1, at 8 (Feb. 1991).
33 Deprizio, 86 Bankr. at 551. District Judge Plunkett posited that "[i]f Congress
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bankruptcy court noted in Coastal Petroleum Corp. v. Union Bank &
Trust Co. (In re Coastal Petroleum Corp.),4 Congress had not altered
the clear language of section 550(a)(1) on either of the two occa-
sions that the Code had been amended since its enactment in
1978. s5
Further, the courts that espoused a literal translation of section
550 were not responsive to the concerns of creditors that would be
forced to disgorge payments received during the extended prefer-
ence period. While the courts emphasizing "equity" had hesitated
to penalize a lender "prudent" enough to obtain an insider's guar-
antee, 6 the Deprizio district court, in affirming the bankruptcy court,
instructed
[a] prudent creditor [to] extensively investigate the guaran-
tor's financial situation and [to] continue to monitor the guar-
antor's finances to make sure he or she can pay in the event of
debtor's default. A creditor can [also] adjust the rate of inter-
est it charges to its debtor to reflect the risk of default by both
the debtor and guarantor.5 7
Similarly, the Big Three court observed that "drafters of loan guar-
anty agreements will have to consider the literal meaning of section
550(a)(1) in advising their lending institution clients." '3 The court
in Coastal Petroleum Corp. agreed that "[a]ny failure of the creditor to
adequately investigate the credit worthiness of the debtor or its in-
sider guarantors should not be viewed as a statutory deficiency but,
rather, as an inherent business risk."3
Significantly, the district court in Lowrey v. First National Bank of
Bethany (In re Robinson Brothers Drilling, Inc. )40 emphasized that lend-
ers wary of the extended preference period were free to find non-
insider guarantors, and that creditors could still resort to section
547(c) defenses.4
had wanted a transfer to occur whenever someone receives a benefit, it could have
defined 'transfer as receiving or acquiring property or an interest in property.'...
But Congress did not; thus, we must conclude that a transfer is an act disposing of
or parting with property." Id.
34 91 Bankr. 35 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988).
35 Id. at 38.
36 See, e.g., Schmitt v. Equibank (In re R.A. Beck Builder, Inc.), 34 Bankr. 888,
894 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1983).
37 In re V. N. Deprizio Constr. Co., 86 Bankr. 545, 553 (N.D. Ill. 1988), aff'd, 874
F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989).
38 41 Bankr. at 21.
39 In re Coastal Petroleum Corp., 91 Bankr. 35, 37 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988).
40 97 Bankr. 77 (W.D. Okla. 1988), aff'd, 892 F.2d 850 (10th Cir. 1989).
41 Id. at 82. Section 547(c) of the Code provides that a trustee may not avoid
transfers that were made: for contemporaneous exchanges of value; in the ordinary
1991] 781
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It was the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Deprizio, however, that
was the most explicitly and articulately unsympathetic to the plight
of the lender whose files of insider guarantees had suddenly become
potential liabilities:
Rules of law affecting parties to voluntary arrangements do
not operate "inequitably" in the business world-at least not
once the rule is understood. Prices adjust. If the extended
preference period facilitates the operation of bankruptcy as a
collective debt-adjustment process, then credit will become
available on slightly better terms. If a longer period has the
opposite effect, creditors will charge slightly higher rates of
interest and monitor debtors more closely. In either case
creditors will receive the competitive rate of return in financial
markets-the same risk-adjusted rate they would have received
with a 90-day preference-recovery period.42
Thus, the Seventh Circuit posited that it would not be inequitable to
apply the extended preference period in recovering from lenders
moneys that would be more equitably distributed among all credi-
tors under the Code.4 3 Indeed, in the wake of such a recovery, the
course of business; that create a purchase money security interest; that were given
for new value, or that created a perfected security interest in inventory or a receiva-
ble or in the proceeds of either. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (1988). Cf. Ray v. City Bank
and Trust Co. (In re C-L Cartage Co.), 899 F.2d 1490, 1495 (6th Cir. 1990) (re-
manding case for evaluation of section 550(b)(1) defenses for lender as mediate
transferee under 550(a)(2)).
42 874 F.2d 1186, 1198 (7th Cir. 1989).
43 Id. Recent decisions have only continued the split among the Circuits. See,
e.g., Harrison v. Brent Towing Co. (In re H&S Transp. Co.), 110 Bankr. 827 (M.D.
Tenn. 1990) (agreeing with the Deprizio court in rejecting the theory that a debtor's
payment to a single creditor can result in "two transfers" under the Code). Unlike
Deprizio, H&S did not involve a bank or an insider-guarantor, and its analysis incor-
porated considerations of "new value" given to the debtor by creditors who were
supplying fuel on credit); In re Smith Materials Corp., 108 Bankr. 784, 786 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1989) (declining to determine whether a lien given less than one year
prior to a bankruptcy filing, and purportedly reducing the personal liability of an
insider principal as guarantor of the debtor, represented a Deprizio-type prefer-
ence).
In Billings v. Zions First Nat'l Bank (In re Granada, Inc.), 110 Bankr. 548
(Bankr. D. Utah. 1990), the bankruptcy court upheld a trustee's Deprizio one-year
preference period action against a lender's motion to dismiss and examined the
avoidability of other insider-debtor transactions. Id. at 549. The trustee brought a
"triangular preference" action to recover from a non-insider lender Granada's pay-
ments on loans "allegedly guaranteed by an insider, or secured by real property
owned by insiders." Id. at 550. Citing Deprizio and In re Robinson Brothers Drilling,
the court held that these transfers "could be found to have benefitted the insider-
creditors because they reduced their potential exposure to liability," and thus that
the trustee had alleged facts "sufficient to state a claim under §§ 547(b) and 550(a)
upon which relief can be granted." Granada, 110 Bankr. at 550-51.
Similarly, the court in Cambridge Meridian Group, Inc. v. Connecticut Nat'l
782
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affected lenders could resort to the benefit of their bargain by bring-
ing an action against the insider guarantors for the amounts due.4 4
The effect of Deprizio, then, is to pit lenders against insider guar-
antors during the period from ninety days through one year before
the debtor's filing for bankruptcy. During this "extended" prefer-
ence period, the debtor's preferential payments to a lender can be
recovered either from the guarantor or from the lender. What are
the relative effects on these actors? How do they reflect, or differ
from, the relationship among other creditors?
A parallel to this situation may be found in game theory's situa-
tion of the Prisoner's Dilemma.
III. THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA
A. Background
Since its original publication in 1950,"5 the Prisoner's Di-
lemma has since been extensively analyzed as "an abstract formu-
lation of some very common and very interesting situations in
which what is best for each person individually leads to mutual
defection [i.e., non-cooperation], whereas everyone would have
Bank (In re Erin Food Serv., Inc.), 117 Bankr. 21 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990) applied
Deprizio's extended preference period to interest repayments made by a restaurant-
operating corporation on a loan personally guaranteed by a corporate insider,
notwithstanding the lender's protest that, because the guarantee was non-recourse
to the insider (i.e., was supported only by assets not owned by the insider), the
insider had not benefitted from these repayments. Id. at 29-30.
In contrast, the district court in Kroh Bros. Dev, Co. v. National Fidelity Life
Ins. Co. (In re Kroh Bros. Dev. Co.), 115 Bankr. 1011 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1990),
indicated in dictum that the Eighth Circuit currently stood against Deprizio. Id. at
1015. Because the debtor failed to establish the elements of a preference, the court
did not address the applicability of an extended preference period to an outside
creditor. Id. In opposition to Deprizio, however, the lender had cited "the highest
authority in the Eighth Circuit." d. (citing Block v. Texas Commerce Bank Nat'l
Ass'n (In re Midwestern Cos., Inc.), 102 Bankr. 169 (W.D. Mo. 1989)). In a foot-
note, the court noted that it would not have been required to follow the Midwestern
decision, but acknowledged that "adherence to the highest authority in one's own
Circuit cannot be lightly abandoned." Id. at n.2.
Finally, in Rubin Bros. Footwear, Inc. v. Chemical Bank (In re Rubin Bros.
Footwear, Inc.), 119 Bankr. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) the Southern District of New York
perfunctorily rejected Deprizio, characterizing it as "a much criticized case, whose
reasoning has not been followed outside of the Seventh Circuit." Id. at 425. Ap-
parently, the court was unaware of C-L Cartage and Robinson Brothers Drilling. The
court stated that the Deprizio rule "would likely impede the availability of credit to
ailing businesses," and thus declined to adopt Deprizio "[b]ecause of its potential
policy implications, and because the Second Circuit has not yet adopted it." Id.
44 Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1198.
45 See R. AXELROD, THE EVOLtrrIoN OF COOPERATION 216 n.2 (1984).
SETON HALL LA W REVIEW
been better off with mutual cooperation. ' ' 46 The Prisoner's Di-
lemma has been used to model group behavior ranging from
trench warfare strategies 47 and international politics 48 to "the
relative savagery of the driving environment in the Boston
area."
49
Not the least of the situations susceptible to this analysis is
that of creditors seeking to recover assets from a bankruptcy es-
tate. It has been suggested that the "single most fruitful way to
think about" the Code is to view it as providing "a way to over-
ride the creditors' pursuit of their own remedies and to make
them work together" toward a common solution.50 Nonetheless,
the reality is that "[e]ach creditor, unless assured of the other's
cooperation, has an incentive to take advantage of individual col-
lection remedies, and to do so before the other creditor acts. '" 5 1
Each creditor, whether insider or non-insider, is thus in the
position of a prisoner in the Prisoner's Dilemma. In the most
popular formulation of this problem, two fellow conspirators are
apprehended by the police and held in separate interrogation
rooms. Each prisoner is given the choice of whether or not to
implicate himself and his associate by confessing. Further, each
is given the following information:
(i) If neither prisoner confesses, each will be sentenced to
two years' imprisonment;
(ii) If only one prisoner confesses, he will be sentenced to
one year's imprisonment, and his fellow prisoner will be sen-
tenced to five years' imprisonment;
(iii) If both prisoners confess, each will be sentenced to
four years' imprisonment.52
46 Id. at 9. Citing the "hundreds of articles" on the Prisoner's Dilemma that
have appeared, Axelrod has noted that the "iterated Prisoner's Dilemma has be-
come the E. coli of social psychology." Id. at 28. See also D. HOFSTADTER, The Pris-
oner's Dilemma Computer Tournaments and the Evolution of Cooperation, in METAMAGICAL
THEMAS: QUESTING FOR THE ESSENCE OF MIND AND PATrERN 715-34 (1985) (sum-
mary and commentary on Axelrod's work).
47 See, e.g., R. AXELROD, supra note 45, at 73-87 (examining the emergence of
cooperation among opposing trench warfare forces during World War I in firing
proforma salvos not intended to injure).
48 Id. at 150-54 (discussing deterrent effect of reputation for retaliation).
49 D. HOFSTADTER, supra note 45, at 732 (exploring the tendency of drivers con-
fronted with selfish driving behavior of others to adopt such behavior themselves,
even towards drivers who have not offended them).
50 T. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 16-17 (1986).
51 Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlement and the Creditors' Bargain, 91
YALE LJ. 857, 862 (1982).
52 R. AXELROD, supra note 45.
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In addition, each prisoner is informed that the other prisoner has
been posed the same choice, with the same possible outcomes.53
In matrix form, the Prisoner's Dilemma appears as follows:
DIAGRAM 1
The Prisoner's Dilemma
Fellow Prisoner Fellow Prisoner
Confesses Does Not Confess
Prisoner
Confesses
Prisoner
Does Not
Confess
The rational prisoner will inevitably be led to "defect," i.e., to
confess.54 He knows that whether his fellow prisoner confesses or
not, his own better option is to confess. Suppose his fellow prisoner
confesses (first column of Diagram I): if the prisoner does not him-
self confess (Situation [4]), he will be sentenced to five years, but if
he confesses (Situation [3]), he will spend only four years in prison.
Likewise, if his associate has not confessed, the prisoner will spend
only one year in prison if he himself confesses (Situation [1]), but
two years if he does not confess (Situation [2]).
Of course, if the prisoners could only communicate with and
53 Id. It is important to note that in the general situation the payoffs to the two
"prisoners' do not have to be the same, or even measured in comparable units (e.g.,
the payoff for one player might be in dollars and for another in increased reputa-
tion). The payoffs for each player, however, must be in the following decreasing or-
der: sole defection, mutual cooperation, mutual defection, sole cooperation. See id.
54 The terminology of the analysis in Axelrod, supra, clearly reflects the moral
superiority postulated for the "cooperator." In the context of the Prisoner's Di-
lemma situation, regardless of society's interest in eliciting confessions and impos-
ing maximum punishment, a premium is placed on the ability to be a "stand-up
guy," i.e., not to confess, even at the risk of being the prisoner punished most
harshly. Cf. Liddy, WILL: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF G. GORDON LIDDY 348 (1980)
(recounting conversation with defense attorney: "If I'm thrown in this thing [the
Watergate prosecution] .... I'll have to sit still, shut up, and take the weight. It's
my job.").
Prisoner Sentenced to Prisoner Sentenced to
Four Years. One Year.
Fellow Prisoner Sentenced Fellow Prisoner Sentenced
to Four Years. 31 to Five Years.
Prisoner Sentenced to [4 [21 Prisoner Sentenced to
Five Years. Two Years.
Fellow Prisoner Sentenced Fellow Prisoner Sentenced
to One Year. to Two Years.
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trust each other, they could "cooperate" by agreeing that neither
would confess: they would thus minimize the total time that they
would spend in prison. In the absence of such communication and
trust, however, each should rationally confess, and the two should
thus face the harshest total punishment.55
Similarly, creditors find themselves pitted against each other for
a troubled debtor's assets. Each creditor would, in the absence of
preference rules, be tempted to enter into a deal with a troubled
debtor to have its own loan paid off before all others. The relative
desirability of the four outcomes of the Prisoner's Dilemma is the
same for each individual creditor as it is for each of the two
prisoners:
[1] if the actor in question defects (i.e., if the creditor
grabs for the debtor's assets, or if the prisoner confesses) and
the other actors do not, he does best;
[2] if all actors cooperate (i.e., if creditors allow the
debtor's assets to be distributed under the Code, or if neither
prisoner confesses) all do reasonably well;
[3] if all actors defect (i.e., if the creditors all grab for the
debtor's assets, or if both prisoners confess), all end up doing
poorly; and
[4] if the individual creditor is the sole cooperator (i.e.,
the only creditor that does not make a grab, or the one pris-
oner that does not confess), he does worst.56
55 While there is little mystery about the optimal resolution (mutual "coopera-
tion") and likely outcome (mutual "defection") of the above situation, the "iter-
ated" Prisoner's Dilemma, in which the "prisoners" face each other again and again
in the same environment, has been extensively studied. Of central concern to game
theorists is the strategy (i.e., reaction to an opponent's choice of defection or coop-
eration in the previous rounds) that most successfully leads to extended mutual
cooperation. As discussed in Axelrod's THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION, comput-
erized tournaments enabling multiple encounters among various strategies have
demonstrated that the best such strategy seems to be Axelrod's "TIT FOR TAT":
"the policy of cooperating on the first [trial] and then doing whatever the other
player did on the previous [trial]." R. AXELROD, supra note 45, at 13. "What ac-
counts for TIT FOR TAT's robust success is its combination of being nice, retalia-
tory, forgiving, and clear." Id. at 54.
56 Although two prisoners were all that were necessary to populate the universe
of the Prisoner's Dilemma, where the matrix in Diagram 2 is used in the creditor
context, the "adversary" creditor that the individual plays against does not repre-
sent just one creditor, but all other creditors of the estate. In the simplest case, the
bankruptcy estate would contain only two creditors, equally aware of the troubled
debtor's circumstances. In more realistic situations, however, with dozens if not
hundreds or thousands of creditors, the matrix does not represent the decision of
one creditor to cooperate with another's grab for assets, but instead portrays the
struggle of an individual creditor against all other creditors, both insiders and non-
insiders, all of whom are presumed to be acting the same. (Of course, in more
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In the Prisoner's Dilemma, mutual defection results where each
prisoner knows all relevant information about his situation, except
for the decision of the other prisoner. In the bankruptcy analog,
where much more information is available and relevant to the credi-
tors' obtaining a debtor's assets, insiders and other creditors with
access to the best information about the debtor's financial prospects
will be the least likely to pursue the equality of the collective pro-
cess. Indeed, the true threat of an insider creditor is that it is not
actually in a Prisoner's Dilemma relationship with the general mass
of insider and non-insider creditors. The insider, who enjoys a
great informational advantage over non-insiders, would prefer hav-
ing all creditors to grab for assets (Situation [3], above) rather than
all creditors to allow the debtor's assets to be distributed under the
Code (Situation [2], above). However, the insider guarantor may
well be in a Prisoner's Dilemma situation with respect to other in-
sider guarantors, or, generally, other insider creditors.
One commentator has cited three factors that might lead even
insider creditors to abandon their individual efforts: they may lose a
race among all creditors, while still having to incur the costs of par-
ticipation in such a race; the remedies (e.g., foreclosure) that they
secure on their own may not be immediately available; and there
would remain "elements of uncertainty and associated increased
CoStS."
5 7
But these factors should be of little importance to an insider of
the debtor. Indeed, an insider is supplied, at little or no extra cost
to itself, with the most current information about the corporation's
financial health. Thus, the insider is in the best position to deter-
mine the risk involved in its own investments and to take steps to
reduce that risk. Moreover, the insider's uncertainty can be reduced
to a minimum. Whether or not remedies are immediately available,
the insider can begin to protect its interests before other creditors
realize that their own investments are jeopardized. It is precisely
these dangers that justify the extended preference period for
insiders:
Insiders pose special problems. Insiders will be the first
to recognize that the firm is in a downward spiral.
[I]nsiders bent on serving their own interests.., could do
so by inducing the firm to pay the guaranteed loans preferen-
complicated models, a certain percentage of the other creditors could be seen as
cooperating or defecting, and this would proportionately affect the payoffs for the
lone creditor on whose actions this analysis focuses).
57 Jackson, supra note 51, at 864.
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tially. If the preference-recovery period for such payments
were identical to the one for outside debts, this would be an
attractive device for insiders. While concealing the firm's true
financial state, they would pay off (at least pay down) the debts
they had guaranteed, while neglecting others. To the extent
that they could use private information to do this more than
90 days ahead of the filing in bankruptcy, they would make out
like bandits.5"
Additionally, an extended preference period for insiders
contribute[s] to the ability of the bankruptcy process to deter
last-minute grabs of assets. The outsiders who must kick into
the pool when the trustee uses the avoiding powers retain
their contractual entitlements; all the trustee's recovery does is
ensure that those entitlements (as modified by any statutory
priorities)-rather than the efforts of insiders to protect their
own interests, or the cleverness of outsiders in beating the 90-
day deadline-determine the ultimate distribution of the
debtor's net assets.59
B. Application to Modeling the Deprizio Situation
The insider guarantor is not in a typical Prisoner's Dilemma
position with respect to the lender that has made the guaranteed
loan. While each prisoner faced the possibility that he would
confess and his fellow prisoner would not, in the preferential
payment context effective action must be mutual: the lender and
the insider guarantor either both "cooperate" by not having the
debtor pay the bank preferentially on its loans, or both "defect"
by allowing such preferential payments to be made. It makes no
sense for the insider to arrange for the debtor to pay the lender
preferentially if the lender does not accept these payments, or for
the lender to make plans to accept these payments if they are not
58 Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. [In re V.N. Deprizio Constr. Co.], 874 F.2d
1186, 1195 (7th Cir. 1989). See also Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (In re V.N.
Deprizio Constr. Co.), 86 Bankr. 545, 552 (N.D. Ill. 1988) ("An insider usually
knows sooner than an outside creditor whether the debtor is likely to sink or swim.
When bankruptcy becomes likely or even possible, insiders have enormous incen-
tive to compel the debtor to prefer insiders to outsiders. Obviously, the insider
would prefer to receive one hundred cents on the dollar outside of bankruptcy
rather than take his chances in the bankruptcy proceeding."); Block v. Texas Com-
merce Nat'l Assoc. (In re Midwestern Cos.), 102 Bankr. 169, 170-73 (W.D. Mo.
1989) (justifying extended preference period on grounds that "insiders ordinarily
can foresee financial trouble before non-insider/creditors," and recognizing
probability that insider will "be able to influence when debt payments are made and
when bankruptcy is filed").
59 In re Deprizio Constr. Co., 874 F.2d 1186, 1195 (7th Cir. 1989).
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forthcoming.6 °
The insider guarantor's situation vis-a-vis the lender thus
collapses into the following two-cell matrix representation. This
mode of analysis reflects the perception of the "two-transfer"
theory that the same preferential loan repayment from debtor to
lender benefits both the guarantor and the lender. As will be
demonstrated, the key is to determine how much benefit is ex-
pected by the lender and the insider guarantor from each prefer-
ential payment.
DIAGRAM 2
Reduced Prisoner's Dilemma
(Bankruptcy Context)
Lender Accepts Lender Does Not Accept
Preferential Payment Preferential Payment
Insider
Guarantor
Arranges for Insider Guarantor
DeborL to Gains.
Make
Preferential Lender Gains.
Payment
Insider
Guarantor Insider Guarantor Neither
Does Not Gains Nor Loses.
Arrange for
Preferential Lender Neither Gains
Payment Nor Loses.
The relative positions of the lender and the insider guaran-
tor, both before and after Depizio, can be reflected by an elabora-
tion of this model.
1. The Ground States: "Zero"
"Zero" will be used as a reference point, to stand for the
financial positions of the lender and the insider guarantor without
anticipating preferential payments, whether or not those pay-
ments are recoverable from the lender under Deprizio. The
"zero" of the lender actually represents the time-value of the ex-
60 The lender, it should be noted, might not be making a special effort to accept
a preferential payment. Indeed, the lender may not be aware of a troubled debtor's
financial condition, and thus may not realize the potentially preferential nature of a
given payment.
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pected set of non-preferential repayments on the loan, whether
such payments come from the debtor itself or whether the lender
must pursue the guarantor for the payments. Thus, the lender's
zero incorporates both the probability that at some point during
the collection process the lender will have to pursue the guaran-
tor and the probability that in such a situation the guarantor will
not fulfill its obligation under the guaranty.
The "zero" of the insider guarantor represents the guaran-
tor's anticipated liability on the loan. The insider guarantor's
zero includes the guarantor's expectations that the guarantor it-
self will actually be held liable on its guaranty and the guarantor's
estimate of its then being able to fulfill this obligation. Similar to
the lender's "zero" position, the insider guarantor's does not in-
corporate the possibility of preferential repayments.
Many subsidiary factors are involved in these calculations.
For the purposes of this analysis, it is unnecessary to know the
exact values of the lender's and insider guarantor's "zeroes." In
fact, the "zeroes" may represent different dollar values. 6' This
article addresses the change from these "ground states" that the
preferential payments, and then the Deprizio "correction," will ac-
complish. For instance, when the lender is said to expect to gain
an amount, that amount is the expected increase over the initial
expected amount which has been calibrated as "zero" for the
lender.
In Diagram 2 above, Situation [II] reflects that, by definition
of the actors' "zeroes," the certainty that a preferential payment
will not be made has no effect on the actors' expected payoffs
from the loan transaction. A preferential payment would, how-
61 For example, if both the lender and the insider guarantor are certain that the
debtor will make complete and non-preferential repayment, the "zero" of each
should actually be a positive number. The lender's "zero" will reflect the interest
that the lender will gain on the loan transaction, and the insider guarantor's "zero"
will indicate the positive value that the guarantor attaches to having the loaned
money available for use by the debtor. There is no reason, however, that these
"zeros" should be the same number. Indeed, while the lender's expectations, in-
volving the time value of money, are fairly quantitative, the guarantor's must be
more speculative, as they involve calculations of the benefits that will accrue to the
guarantor from the debtor's use of the borrowed funds.
The lender's and the insider guarantor's "zeroes" will diverge even more
sharply where both are unsure that the debtor will make complete repayment.
Here, because of their differing access to inside information, the lender and the
guarantor will necessarily attach different probabilities to the possibility of the
debtor's going bankrupt within any given time period, as well as to the guarantor's
ability to repay the loaned amounts during any such period. The insider guaran-
tor's estimates of these probabilities should be the more accurate.
790 [Vol. 21:774
DEPRIZIO'S HONOR
ever, benefit both the insider guarantor and the lender. That is,
such a payment would raise the expected gains from the loan
above these "zeroes": the insider guarantor's anticipated liability
on its guarantee would more quickly be ieduced, and the lender
would receive repayment earlier than expected.62
In this reduced Prisoner's Dilemma situation, both the in-
sider guarantor and the lender have an incentive to do the wrong
thing: the guarantor, to offer the preferential payment, and the
bank, to accept it. In fact, the dissimilarities to the Prisoner's Di-
lemma make it even more likely that such "mutual defection" will
occur in this situation. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, the prisoners
knew that, in any possible outcome, at least one of them would
experience a negative outcome (i.e., would go to jail). In the
preferential repayment situation, there is no negative outcome
from the attempt to make a preferential payment - at worst, the
payment will be avoided as a preference. Further, there is a
chance that the debtor will in fact not go bankrupt within a year
of the payment date. In that case, the payment would not qualify
as a preference under section 547(b) of the Code and the lender
could retain the funds conveyed.
Thus, it is necessary to factor into the model the expecta-
tions of the insider guarantor and of the non-insider lender that
the debtor will file for bankruptcy protection during various peri-
ods in the year after the date of transfer.
2. Timing of Bankruptcy
Probability theory expresses the expected payoff of a prefer-
ential transfer for the lender and the insider guarantor as the
sum of the expected payoffs of that transfer in the following three
cases: (1) the debtor's filing for bankruptcy within ninety days of
the transfer; (2) the debtor's filing after ninety days but within
one year of the transfer; and (3) the debtor's not filing for bank-
ruptcy within one year after the transfer. Variables b90, b365,
and b999 shall stand for the respective probabilities that each of
these events shall occur.63
62 For various reasons, the certainty of receiving a non-recoverable preferential
payment in the amount of X may not be expected to benefit the lender or the in-
sider guarantor by the exact amount X. For example, the payment may benefit the
lender by the amount X plus interest. The simplifying assumption has been made,
however, that the benefit would indeed be X, and that the benefit is the same for
both guarantor and lender.
63 Note that b365 does not equal the probability that the debtor will go file for
bankruptcy within a year after the transfer, but instead stands for lesser probability
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Each of these three probability variables can take on a value
from zero (representing the expectation that the given event defi-
nitely will not occur) to one (representing the expectation that the
event definitely will occur). Because one of the three events dis-
cussed above must happen (i.e., the debtor will either go bank-
rupt within ninety days, within ninety days to a year, or not within
the year), the sum of the three probabilities is equal to one.'
Within each of these three timing situations, the payoff po-
tentials for the insider guarantor and for the lender must be eval-
uated. Assuming that if the debtor goes bankrupt within a year,
recovery will be made from either the guarantor or the lender,
the probabilities of recovery from each party can be represented
as follows. Variable g90 will represent the expected probability
that, if the debtor goes bankrupt within ninety days, recovery will
be made from the guarantor. Because we have posited that if
recovery is not made from the guarantor it will be made from the
lender, (1 - g9O) will then stand for the probability that recovery
will be made from the lender if the debtor goes bankrupt within
ninety days. Similarly, g365 and (1 - g365) will stand for the ex-
pectations that if the debtor goes bankrupt more than ninety days
but less than a year after bankruptcy, recovery will be made from
the insider guarantor and from the lender, respectively. 65
If a preferential payment in the amount of X is recovered
from the insider guarantor or the lender that actor's payoff
should be zero. Likewise, the payoff to the actor(s) from whom
the payment is not recovered is X. Thus, without taking the
guarantor's right of subrogation against the debtor into account,
the expected payoff for the insider guarantor from a preferential
transfer in the amount of X can be expressed as the sum of the
expected payoffs from all possible situations resulting from this
transfer. Each situation has its own associated probability, as set
forth above, and would result in payoff X (if the transfer is not
recovered from the party in question) or 0 (if the transfer is re-
that that the debtor will file its bankruptcy petition between ninety days and a year
after the transfer. Of course, the lender and the insider guarantor may attach very
different values to these variables; as noted supra at n.62, the insider guarantor's
values will usually be the more accurate.
64 In mathematical terms, b90 + b365 + b999 = 1.
65 If the debtor goes bankrupt more than a year after the payment is made, the
payment is not preferential and cannot be recovered from either the guarantor or
the bank. Thus, the corresponding variable g99 9 will not be used explicitly since
its value would be zero. Likewise, any representation of the probability that the
payment would be recovered from the lender in this situation would also be zero.
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covered from the party in question). Thus, the insider guaran-
tor's expected payoff from the transfer can be represented as:
INSIDER GUARANTOR'S EXPECTED PAYOFF FROM
TRANSFER =
Expected payoff if debtor does not file for bankruptcy
within a year after the transfer = X(b999)
+ Expected payoff if debtor files for bankruptcy within
ninety days of the transfer and the payment is recovered
from the lender = X(b90)(l - g90)
+ Expected payoff is debtor files for bankruptcy within
ninety days after the transfer and the payment is recov-
ered from the insider guarantor = 0(b90)(g90) = 0
+ Expected payoff if debtor files for bankrupty within
ninety days to a year after the transfer and the payment is
recovered from the lender = X(b365)(l - g365)
+ Expected payoff if debtor files for bankruptcy within
ninety days to a year after the transfer and the payment is
recovered from the insider guarantor = 0(b365) (g365)
=0.
Thus,
INSIDER GUARANTOR'S EXPECTED
PAYOFF FROM TRANSFER =
X[b699 + b90(l - g90) +b365(l - g3 6 5 )]
Similarly, the expected payoff to the lender can be expressed
as:
LENDER'S EXPECTED PAYOFF
FROM TRANSFER = X[b999 + b90g90 +b365g365]
If the lender or the insider guarantor is certain that there will
be a bankruptcy within a year and that recovery of preferential
payments will be made from the guarantor, that party will expect
the guarantor's payoff from the transfer to be zero.66 That is, the
lender will be expected to keep the preferential payment made by
the debtor, and thus to reduce by this amount the guarantor's
liability on the guarantee. The guarantor will, however, be ex-
pected to disgorge this amount by the trustee of the debtor's es-
tate. In this situation, the lender will be expected to gain the
amount of the preferential payment, because it will not itself have
66 That is, where b999 = 0, g90 = 1 and g365 = 1, the insider guarantor's
expected payoff from the preferential transfer, X[b999+b90 (1-g9O)+b365(1-
g3 6 5 )] = X[0+O+0]=O.
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to disgorge the transfer that it received.6 7
If, on the other hand, there is a certainty that the transfer
will be recovered from the lender as a preference, the lender's
expected payoff will be zero: it will have neither gained nor lost
from the transaction. 68 Here, the guarantor's expected payoff
would be X, the full value of the preferential payment, because
the guarantor's exposure would be reduced by this amount with-
out his having to pay any of the amount out of pocket. 69
3. The Deprizio Effect
a. Non-Deprizio
In those circuits rejecting Deprizio, all recovery of preferential
payments made during the period from ninety days through one
year after a preferential payment is made would come from the
insider guarantor, rather than from the lender. In the terms of
the mathematical model, g365 = 1.
This would affect the payoffs for the bank and the guarantor
as follows:
INSIDER GUARANTOR'S EXPECTED PAYOFF FOR
TRANSFER (NON-DEPRIZIO) =
X[b699 + b90(l - g90) + b365(l - g365)] =
X[b999 + b90(l - g90)].
The insider guarantor's expected payoff would thus depend on
b999, the expectation that the payment would not turn out to be
preferential (i.e., that the debtor would not file for bankruptcy
within the year after the transfer), as well as the expectations that
the debtor would go bankrupt within ninety days after the trans-
fer (b90) and that collection in this case could be made from the
lender (1 - g90).
Because in those circuits rejecting Deprizio recovery during
the extended preference period could be made only from the
guarantor, the lender's expected payoff, if the debtor did not file
67 If the parameter values of footnote 66, supra, are applied to the expression for
the lender's expected payoff for a preferential transfer, X[b999 + b90g90 +
b365g365], that expression takes on the value X[O + b90 + b365], or X, because,
if the bankruptcy is expected to occur in one year, b90 + b365 = 1.
68 Where b999 = 0, g90 = 0, and g3 6 5 = 0, the lender's expected payoff for a
preferential transfer, X[b999 + b90g90 + b365g365], reduces to X[0 + 0 + 0], or
0.
69 The values given in footnote 68, supra, will impart a value of X to the insider
guarantor's expected payoff for a preferential transfer, X[b999 + b90(l-g90) +
b365(1-g365)], because b90+b365= 1 if a bankruptcy is expected within one year
of the transfer.
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for bankruptcy within ninety days of the transfer, would be the
entire amount of the preferential payment. That is, because the
lender would be receiving this payment from the debtor and
would not have to disgorge it in any event, the whole amount of
the payment would be gained by the lender.
LENDER'S EXPECTED PAYOFF FOR TRANSFER
(NON-DEPRIZIO) =
X[b999+b90g90+b365g365] =
X[b999 + b90g90 + b365]
Thus, where Deprizio has not prevailed, the insider guarantor
has an incentive to make a potentially preferential payment if it
believes that (a) the debtor can remain out of bankruptcy for one
year after the transfer or that (b) the debtor will go bankrupt
within ninety days after the transfer and that collection in this
case could be made from the lender. The lender will have incen-
tive to accept such a payment if it believes that (a) the debtor can
remain out of bankruptcy for ninety days after the transfer or that
(b) if the debtor goes bankrupt before ninety days have expired,
collection will be made from the guarantor. Because any pay-
ment, preferential or not, would redound to the lender's advan-
tage, however, the lender has reason to encourage preferential
payments.
b. Deprizio
By introducing the possibility that preferential payments
made during the extended preference period may be recovered
from the lender rather than from the guarantor during the ex-
tended preference period, Deprizio lowers the value of variables
g90 and g365 from one to some positive fraction less than or
equal to one. The expected payoff equations resume their un-
reduced form, as none of the variables can be given a firm value.
INSIDER GUARANTOR'S EXPECTED PAYOFF
FOR TRANSFER (DEPRIZIO) =
X[b999+b90(1 - g90) + b365(1-g365)].
LENDER'S EXPECTED PAYOFF FOR TRANSFER
(DEPRIZIO) =
X[b999 + b90g90 + b365g365].
The total of both the bank's and guarantor's expected gains
from a preferential payment is not affected by the application of
Deprizio.70 Deprizio, however, redistributes the expected benefits
70 The difference is
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of a preferential transfer from the lender to the guarantor. The
guarantor's expected payoff for a preferential payment is raised
by the amount that the guarantor expects to recover if the debtor
files for bankruptcy within ninety days to one year after the pref-
erential transfer and recovery is made from the lender;7' the
lender's expected payoff is lowered by the same amount.7 2
4. Implications
a. Inside Information-Debtor's Financial Health
As discussed above, the insider guarantor is typically better
able than the lender to accurately estimate and manipulate the
timing probabilities of bankruptcy: b90, and b365, and b999. If
the insider guarantor knows that the debtor's filing will be made
within a year following the transfer, the insider guarantor will be
willing to press the idea of a potentially preferential transaction if
it believes that it would not be the source of any subsequent re-
covery (i.e., if it assigns small values to g90 and g365). This is
not the reasoning that the guarantor would care to share with the
lender, however, whom the guarantor believes will be disgorging
the payment to the trustee.
If the insider believes that the debtor can stay out of bank-
ruptcy for more than a year, the insider should convey this infor-
mation to the lender. If the insider's expectation is correct-if
the payment allows the debtor to stay alive for another year-it
will not be regarded as preferential and will not be recoverable
from either the insider guarantor or the lender.
X[b999 + b90(l-g90) + b365(1 - g36 5) + X[b999 + b90g90 + b365g365] -
[X + (b999) + X] =
X[b999 + b90(1 - g9O) + b365(1 - g365) + b90g90 + b365g365 - 1] =
X[b999 + b90 - b90g90 + b365 - b365g365 + b90g90 + b365g365 - (b999 +
b90 + b365)] = 0
71 The difference between the guarantor's expected payoff for a preferential
payment in ajurisdiction that accepts Deprizio and one in which Deprizio is rejected is
INSIDER GUARANTOR'S EXPECTED PAYOFF FOR TRANSFER
(DEPRIZIO) -
INSIDER GUARANTOR'S EXPECTED PAYOFF FOR TRANSFER (NON-
DEPRIZIO) =
X[b999 + b90(l-g90) + b365(l-g365)] -
X[b999 + b90(l-g90)] =
X(b365)(l-g3 6 5).
72 LENDER'S EXPECTED PAYOFF FOR TRANSFER (DEPRIZIO) -
LENDER'S EXPECTED PAYOFF FOR TRANSFER (NON-DEPRIZIO) =
X[b999 + b90g90 + b365g365]-
X[b999 + b90g90 + b365] =
-X(b365)(l-g36 5 ).
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b. Inside Information- Guarantor's Financial Health
An important factor not explicitly addressed in these calcula-
tions is the guarantor's ability to repay the preferential payment
to the bankruptcy trustee. Of course, while the lender should be
carefully monitoring the guarantor's financial health, the guaran-
tor should know better than the lender the state of the guaran-
tor's own assets.
In fact, if the guarantor knows that it will not be able to pro-
duce such an amount for recovery, it may be willing to enter into
a preferential transaction whether or not it believes that recovery
would be obtained from him. The lender would end up footing
the bill even if the guarantor was approached first. As banks will
most often not have greater assets than the insider guarantor,
such lenders must use great caution and careful monitoring to
avoid holding a guarantee from an insider who does not have
sufficient collateral to fulfill its obligations.73
c. Waiver of Subrogation Rights
If, following the debtor's bankruptcy, recovery of a preferen-
tial payment was made from the insider guarantor, the guarantor
would have a subrogation claim against the debtor in the amount
of the recovery made from the guarantor. This claim, however,
would most likely not be repaid in full. Assuming that the full
amount, X, of the preferential payment is recovered from the
guarantor, the guarantor could expect to receive the fraction X/
T from the debtor's bankruptcy estate, where T represents the
total amount of the unsecured claims, including X, against the
estate at the time that the debtor files for bankruptcy. This effect
on the insider guarantor's payoff, however, should already have
been taken into account in calculating its zero.
It has been suggested by some commentators that the effects
of Deprizio can be avoided by explicitly eliminating the insider
guarantor's subrogation right against the debtor, thus removing
the insider guarantor's status as a contingent creditor of the
debtor. 4 Deprived of recourse against the debtor, the guarantor
73 The lender's expected payoff equation could be adjusted for the possibility of
partial recovery from the guarantor, by lowering the expected payoff amount, X, by
which the probability of recovery from the guarantor is multiplied. If necessary, the
bankruptcy of a guarantor forced to fulfill its obligations could additionally be
taken into account.
74 Katzen, Deprizio and Bankruptcy Code Section 550: Extended Preference Exposure Via
Insider Guarantees, and Other Perils Of Initial Transferee Liability, 45 Bus. LAw. 511, 530-
31 (1990) (suggesting that waiver of subrogration may implicate lender itself as
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that has to pay the debtor's trustee X will not recover X/T. As-
suming that the waiver of subrogation effectively prevents
Deprizio's extended preference period from being applied,the
expected payoffs for a potentially preferential payment will be as
follows:
INSIDER GUARANTOR'S EXPECTED PAYOFF FOR TRANS-
FER (WAIVER OF SUBROGATION EFFECTIVE TO
COUNTERACT DEPRIZIO) =
INSIDER GUARANTOR'S EXPECTED PAYOFF FOR
PREFERENTIAL PAYMENT (NON-DEPRIZIO) -
EXPECTED LOSS OF SUBROGATION VALUE IN EVENT
OF BANKRUPTCY AND RECOVERY FROM GUARAN-
TOR =
X[b999 + b90(l - g90)] - (X/T)[b90g90 + b365g365]
LENDER'S EXPECTED PAYOFF FOR PAYMENT (WAIVER
OF SUBROGATION EFFECTIVE TO COUNTERACT
DEPRIZIO) =
LENDER'S EXPECTED PAYOFF FOR PAYMENT (NON-
DEPRIZIO) =
X[b999 + b90g90 + b365]
As of the publication of this article, no published decision
has addressed whether the subrogation waiver effectively pre-
vents a court from imposing Deprizio's extended preference pe-
riod on a lender that has taken the guarantee of, and has
accepted payments beneficial to, an insider guarantor.75
insider or may involve lender too deeply in borrower's affairs, not only negating
defense to Deprizio but also handicapping lender's collection efforts in other re-
spects).
Another author has suggested that such a waiver might also cause a loan pay-
ment to be attacked as a fraudulent conveyance, under either the subjective test of
§ 548(a)(1) (transfer made with intent to hinder, defraud, or delay other creditors)
or the objective test of § 548(a)(2) (transfer of assets for less than reasonably
equivalent value). Borowitz, Waiving Subrogation Rights and Conjuring Up Demons in
Response to Deprizio, 45 Bus. LAw. 2151, 2161-65 (1990) (At 2158 n.22, Borowitz
suggests the mathematical approach used above for representing subrogation.).
75 In those jurisdictions that have explicitly rejected Deprizio P may be consid-
ered equal to one: P= 1. Even these jurisdictions, however, have a chance of re-
versing themselves. Assume that the subrogation waiver has a probability of P of
convincing the court that Deprizio is not applicable to the transaction, the expected
payoffs will be as follows:
INSIDER GUARANTOR'S EXPECTED PAYOFF FOR PAYMENT (WAIVER
OF SUBROGATION) =
INSIDER GUARANTOR'S EXPECTED PAYOFF FOR PREFERENTIAL PAY-
MENT (Deprizio Found to Apply Despite Waiver) +
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IV. CONCLUSION
In the face of the extended preference period threat posed
by Deprizio, lenders should carefully evaluate their need for in-
sider guarantees. Such guarantees can be released if a guarantor
is not longer able to fulfill its obligation or if more reliable secur-
ity is available to the lender. While the effectiveness of the in-
sider guarantor's waiver of its subrogation rights remains
untested, lenders would be well-advised to scrutinize the finani-
cal statements of their debtors and insider guarantors. Finally,
lenders could minimize the Prisoner's Dilemma aspects of their
situations by dropping all insider guarantees in favor of imposing
higher interest rates or additional security requirements on the
debtor. Then, these "prisoners" would actually be setting their
own "terms."
INSIDER GUARANTOR'S EXPECTED PAYOFF FOR PREFERENTIAL PAY-
MENT (Waiver Found to Counteract Deprizio) =
P{X[b999 + b90(1 - g90) + b365(l - g3 65)] - (b90Og0 + b365g365)J +
(I - p)[X[b999 + b90(l - g90)] - (b9 g9g + b365g365)1
The waiver of subrogation with uncertain effect thus enables the insider guar-
antor to retain higher expectations than were possible before Deprizio because it still
permits some chance that recovery will be sought from the bank, and not the guar-
antor. The guarantor, however, will expect less than it would without the subroga-
tion waiver, because its prior expectation of recovery against the debtor has been
removed.
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